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Optional Budget Mechanisms with Verifiable Cost Signals: An Experiment
by: Kevin A. Bowen The Ohio State University1
I.  Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of an agent's ability to 
provide discretionary information regarding profitability  in a budgeting context. 
The  setting  I  employ  captures  important  elements  of  many  organization’s 
budgeting systems, such as information asymmetry, limited liability of employees 
and limitations on commitment by superiors.  Through the use of an experiment I 
investigate whether providing an agent with a cost signaling capability decreases 
agency costs and increases efficiency, despite the fact that the signal’s use is 
optional and the principal cannot commit to how the signal will be used. 
The remainder of  this  paper is organized into  six  sections. In  the next 
section,  I  provide  a  brief  review of  literature  to  identify  the  specific  research 
questions which I address. In section three, I outline my  laboratory experiment 
and, in section four, I provide an overview of my hypotheses. The fifth and sixth 
sections contain the results and conclusions, respectively.
II.  Literature Review
A common purpose of budgeting studies is to explore the importance of 
non-pecuniary motivations within an agency setting. Accounting and economic 
researchers  often,  but  not  always,  assume  that  an  agent's  utility  function  is 
directly  and  solely  related  to  monetary  incentives.  Through  the  use  of 
experimental economics, researchers have found that non-pecuniary incentives 
may also have an affect on an agent's decisions. In order to better understand 
the  effects  of  these  non-pecuniary  motivators,  studies  have  focused  on  two 
interrelated  questions.  First,  studies  were  conducted  to  ask  whether  non-
pecuniary motivations played any role in the agent's decision making process. 
Examples  include  Baiman  and  Lewis  [1989],  Evans,  Hannan,  Krishnan,  and 
1 Special thanks is given Richard Young, Steve Schwartz, David Wallin, Eric Spires, and John 
Fellingham. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the Fisher College of Business, the Ohio State 
University Undergraduate Research Office, and the undergraduate participants. This paper 
was part of an undergraduate honors thesis for consideration of graduation with distinction 
form The Ohio State University in June 2009.
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Moser  [2001],  Hannan,  Rankin,  and  Towry  [2006],  Young  [1985],  Hennig-
Schmidt,  Rockenbach,  and   Sadrieh  [2003]. These  studies  found  that  non-
pecuniary  motivations  such  as  honesty,  fairness,  etc.  were  significant  to  the 
agent's decision making process. A second series of studies asks the question of 
how  a superior  can  best  utilize  non-pecuniary  motivations  in  her  design  of 
budgeting systems. One possibility is to put the agent in situations where he is 
asked to submit reports on costs and analyze the mechanisms that encourage 
honest or fair reporting by the agent. This topic of research has shown that, by 
utilizing  a  reporting  mechanism,  it  is  possible  to  reduce  agency  costs  and 
improve efficiency  in  transactions.  Studies  that  have examined the  design  of 
budgeting report systems include Schwartz, Wallin, and Young [2008], Hannan, 
Rankin,  and  Towry  [2006],  Nikias,  Schwartz,  Spires,  Wollscheid,  and  Young 
[2008], Rankin, Schwartz, Young [2007], Rankin, Schwartz, and Young [2003], 
and Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser [2001].
Budgeting researchers have actively  explored the level  of  honesty and 
misrepresentation  that  are  chosen  by  the  agent.  Research  has  identified 
conditions under which an agent is willing to forgo additional monetary incentives 
in order to be honest or appear fair. In Baiman and Lewis [1989], the authors 
explore where the threshold lies for misrepresentation over monetary value is  for 
an informed agent. For this agent, the 'best' contract is only available if the agent 
chooses to misrepresent his qualifications by a non-trivial  amount.  Within this 
setting, BL find that agents are willing to engage in misrepresentation for even a 
small  amount  of  money.  BL's  results  may  have  been  influenced  by  the 
experimental  training  sessions,  where  subjects  practiced  expected  value 
calculations.  While  the  purpose  of  these  exercises  was  to  increase  subject 
understanding of complex contracts, the practice in calculating expected value 
may  have  unintentionally  caused  the  subjects  to  focus  their  analysis  on  a 
monetary motivation more than they otherwise would have. 
Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser [2001] (EHKM) also explored how 
an agent's preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting in an 
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experiment  that  was  based  on  Antle  and  Eppen  (1985).  Using  a  simpler 
experiment compared to BL, EHKM found that agents offer a non-trivial amount 
of wealth to the principal even though the economic opportunity cost of honesty 
was quite high. So long as the agent was able to extract a fair share of profit from 
the opportunity, the agent was willing to return a non-trivial portion of slack back 
to the principal.
Schwartz, Spires, Wallin, and Young [2008] (SSWY) explore the effects of 
the budget proposal format on budget acceptance rates in a management control 
setting.  SSWY focus  on  capturing  the  benefits  of  aggregation  and  delay  in 
budgetary reporting where there is an option to take three individual projects. 
SSWY  finds  that  an  aggregation  of  projects  greatly  increases  the  project 
acceptance rate  relative to  disaggregated reporting,  and that  delaying project 
proposals  is  less  effective  at  increasing  project  acceptance  than  aggregate 
reporting,  but  is  still  more  efficient  than  disaggregate  reporting.  The  authors 
conclude that these findings are due to the smoothing of costs that are made 
possible due to the aggregation of costs. Since costs may vary considerably over 
the three projects, the agent is able to present aggregate costs so as to suggest 
a 'fair' distribution of costs. One high cost project can be offset by another low 
cost project in the agent's aggregated report because the principal is not making 
individual decisions. Furthermore, they conclude that when the principal has the 
option of using a smoothed cost, as they do in the delayed setting, the principal 
chooses not to utilize the aggregate costs of the three projects together and the 
effectiveness  of  smoothing  is  decreased.  This  observation  suggests  that  the 
principal prefers to look at costs of individual projects even though looking at 
them in aggregate is optimal for both parties. This can be seen as the principal's 
desire to use the signals that contain the most information. These findings are 
important to my experiment because they indicate that the design of reporting 
procedures can lead to non-trivial reduction in agency costs.
Nikias, Schwartz, Spires, Wollscheid, and Young [2008] explore additional 
theories as to why aggregation is a part of management control. In addition to 
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image management and a perceived benefit  of honesty, NSSWY highlight the 
effects of guilt alleviation (especially in driving kindness in subsequent acts) and 
the agent’s need to cope with uncertainty. All of these behavioral predictions may 
help explain why the use of cost signals can be useful in reducing agency costs 
in  our  experiment.  Most  important  to  my study is  NSSWY's  discovery  of  the 
agent's  need  to  cope  with  uncertainty.  The  use  of  a  verifiable  signal  should 
alleviate some uncertainty on the agent, especially the agent's uncertainty for the 
principal's actions.
Hannan, Rankin, and Towry [2006] offer an expanded study into the trade-
offs  between  the  benefits  of  appearing  honest  and  the  benefits  of 
misrepresentation for the agent. This study also introduces the use of information 
signals, although they have limited strategic effectiveness because every budget 
proposal from the agent is automatically accepted. The authors find that, if an 
information signal is used, the agent prefers a signal with a coarse indication of 
actual  cost  because it  allows the agent  to  balance the benefits  of  appearing 
honest  with  some  amount  of  wealth  from  misrepresentation.  When  the 
information system becomes more precise,  the agent  shifts  the balance from 
appearing  honest  to  utilizing  his  ability  to  capture  wealth  through 
misrepresentation.  Therefore,  it  can  be  better  for  the  principal  to  create  an 
information system that  is  coarse enough to  allow the agent some non-trivial 
slack and still  have him report honestly. For my experiment, the balancing act 
that the agent undertakes is quite different in that we allow the principal to reject 
offers. Because the rejection of offers introduces strategic interaction back into 
the budgeting scenario, I expect that the principal will use her power of rejection 
to refuse projects that fall outside of her threshold for fairness. While a certain 
amount  of  slack  is  still  desirable  to  the  agent,  the  threat  of  rejection  by  the 
principal may cause the agent to report more truthfully than in HRT's experiment.
The first effect of a cost signal is that it offers the agent a verified indication 
of his honesty in reporting to the principal. In the absence of a cost signal, a high 
monetary value report by the agent can mean two things for the principal: (1), 
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that the agent is faced with a high cost when he observed the project or, (2), that 
the agent is misrepresenting costs to extract non-trivial wealth from the principal. 
The information asymmetry leads to a moral hazard problem and, coupled with 
non-pecuniary motivations for fairness or/and honesty,  may cause the principal 
to  reject  a  large  portion  of  high-request  projects.  These  rejections  cause  a 
significant  loss  in  social  efficiency  and  make  high-cost  (although  profitable) 
projects much harder to get approved. The cost signal provides the principal with 
additional information on whether the agent is reporting honestly.  The second 
effect is that a cost signal allows the agent to deal with his uncertainty over how 
the principal will respond to different budget requests. After viewing project costs, 
the agent faces considerable uncertainty about where to report cost so as to get 
the project approved and extract some wealth from the project.  A cost signal 
alleviates some of this uncertainty by giving the agent the ability to indicate actual 
costs  along  with  his  budget  report.  Such  a  report  should  give  the  principal 
enough  information  to  approve  a  high-budget  request  even  though  she  is 
receiving a relatively low amount of slack.
III.   Experimental Setting  
In the experiment there is a principal and an agent, who interact only once. 
The  principal  employs  an  agent  for  the  purpose  of  managing  a  potential 
investment.  The  agent  is  able  to  privately  view  the  actual  cost  (c) of  an 
investment drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on {0,1,2,...,199,200}. In all 
cases, the parameters are common knowledge; the only private information is 
the actual cost. The agent keeps as slack any difference between the funding 
and the actual cost.  The cost of the investment (c) can only be observed by the 
agent. The revenues (R) are non-stochastic and common knowledge. In all cases 
the investment will provide revenues of  R = 200, which will be received by the 
principal if the project is approved. 
The principal requests that the agent submit a budget request (B) for the 
investment  that  has  to  cover  the  investment’s  costs  and  include  the  agent's 
desired slack for managing the investment. The only constraints on the request is 
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it cannot exceed the highest feasible cost and it cannot fall below the actual cost, 
implying that slack must be non-negative. The principal  then observes  B  and 
decides whether to approve or reject the request, but she cannot make an  ex 
ante commitment as to how she will act.2 If approved, the principal pays B to the 
agent and collects all revenues from the investment, so his earnings are R - B, 
and the agent  consumes as slack any difference between the budget proposal 
and the actual cost (B – c). If the request is rejected, both parties receive zero 
earnings from the investment. For the agent, it is necessary to submit a budget 
request that is greater than his observed actual cost if he wishes to make any 
profits from the investment.3   
III (A). Benchmark Setting
The Rankin et al. (2003)  no signal [NS] case is the benchmark for this 
experiment. In the [NS] case, the agent is only able to submit his budget request 
(B) without additional signals on cost.  The parameters of the equilibrium analysis 
experiment  imply  that  the  agent  should  always  request  199.  Given  that  the 
principal  is  motivated by monetary wealth,  she will  approve a request of  199 
because rejecting the request means the principal receives no slack. With this 
assumption of principal behavior, the agent has no incentive to request anything 
but  199.  This  outcome  is  what  utility  maximizing  agents  will  exhibit  under 
traditional economic assumptions about preferences. However, the allocation of 
wealth  may appear  unfair  to  the  principal,  and potentially  to  society  as  well, 
depending on how it views property rights. Because individuals commonly avoid 
“unfair” distributions of wealth in spite of countervailing pecuniary incentives, past 
experiments  have  seen  the  principal  as  facing  non-pecuniary  costs  when 
accepting an unfair offer as well as pecuniary costs when rejecting an unfair, yet 
profitable offer.
2 This lack of commitment makes this experiment fundamentally different than the experiment 
used in Antle and Eppen (1985).
3 This misrepresentation should not be confused with dishonesty. The issue is a commingling of 
concerns for fairness and honesty with the first order concern for one's own wealth. It is 
common knowledge to both parties that the agent's slack from the investment is directly 
related to his requested distribution of available slack, in that the agent must lie to extract any 
slack from the project.
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Anticipating that  the  principal  may reject  a  proposal  that  she views as 
unfair, the agent tends to submit budget requests that provide the principal with a 
perceived-to-be  fair  level  of  profit  [RSY  2003].  However  my  budget  setting 
feature  significant  information  asymmetry  between  principal  and  agent.  The 
agent can exploit this feature by extracting large rents from the principal without 
the principal knowing the fairness of the agent’s actions. This would occur in my 
setting when the actual cost is low but the agent submits a relatively high budget 
request. Conversely, the principal may perceive a proposal to be unfair when in 
fact  actual  costs are high and the agent  had no choice but  to submit  a high 
budget proposal. In this case the principal may reject a proposal that she would 
otherwise accept, if she were better informed. 
One potential way to facilitate a reduction in agency costs is to provide the 
agent  with  a  mechanism  that  can  produce  verifiable  signals  regarding  the 
investment’s cost. Such a signal is useful because it can provide the principal 
with a true basis for judging the fairness of a proposal. In this experiment, the use 
of this mechanism is at the option of the agent. However if sent, the signal  is 
constrained to be truthful.  Under the optional signal treatment,  it  is left  to the 
agent to decide on the precision of the signal.  A comparable situation might be 
the following.  A  hotel  can disclose online how close it  is  to some facility  of 
interest, e.g. an airport or an amusement park. A hotel three blocks away might 
disclose “within half a mile”, “within five miles” or make no disclosure at all. A 
hotel five miles away would be limited to not claiming to be less than five miles 
away. Potential guests may make inference about the exact location of the hotel 
given the disclosure made.4 Also, companies base their per diem payments on 
the signal of the city that the employee traveled to for business. For example, the 
per diem for Chicago would be greater than the per diem for Columbus, Ohio 
because the  employer  has  a  rough idea of  the  higher  costs  incurred  by  the 
employee in each city.
4 Of course potential guests can simply call the hotel and get a more precise disclosure, many 
do not avail themselves of this option. To the extent that many people do not call, this setting 
is very similar to the one I explore.
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It is important to understand the motivation for the limited liability by the 
agent. In this setting, the agent is not asked to pay for the cost of investment 
before being paid by the principal.  This forces the principal  to make all  cash 
outlays and provides the agent with slack for investment management and not 
financial risk. This is analogous to the business world because employees are 
rarely expected to pay, out of pocket, for million dollar projects but are still paid 
based on the success of the project. In keeping with that model, this setting does 
not ask the agent to assume all the liability of investment and, instead, puts that 
responsibility on the principal.
Using  game theory  to  evaluate  this  setting,  the  signal  would  have  no 
economic value to either the agent or the principal. The agent's optional decision 
is still to submit budget requests equal to 199, because the wealth-maximizing 
principal would prefer profit of one over no profit. The introduction of this signal 
does not change this setting because the use of the signal has no direct effect on 
his payoffs, the wealth-maximizing agent will send no signal (because the signal 
is noise) and request 199. The principal will see that a budget request offers him 
revenue  of  1  and  will  accept  the  project  regardless  of  the  lacking  signal.  In 
equilibrium, the signal will have no value to either the principal or the agent.
III (B) Treatments
There are three treatments in this experiment:  Always Signal Fine [ASF], 
Always  Signal  Coarse  [ASC]  and  Optional  Signal  [OS].  In  [ASF]  the  agent 
submits  a  budget  request  and in  addition  must  send a  truthful  but  imperfect 
signal  about  cost   — no option  of  withholding  information is  available  to  the 
agent. The signal truthfully reveals in which 1/8th of the cost distribution the actual 
cost lies, i.e., [0,25], [26,50], [51,75], [76,100] etc… Observing both the budget 
request  and  the  signal,  the  principal  will  either  accept  or  reject  the  budget 
request.  If  accepted,  the  principal  will  provide  the  agent  with  his  full  budget 
request, regardless of the cost signal observed by the principal. This treatment is 
important for  comparison with the [OS] treatment and a no signal  benchmark 
because the agent is forced to send a cost signal.
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In [ASC] the agent submits a budget request and in addition must send a 
truthful but imperfect signal about cost — no option of withholding information is 
available  to  the  agent.  The  signal  truthfully  reveals  in  which  1/4  of  the  cost 
distribution's support the actual cost lies, i.e., [0,50], [51,100], [101,150] etc…. 
Observing both the budget request and the signal, the principal will either accept 
or reject the budget request. If accepted, the principal will provide the agent with 
his full budget request, regardless of the cost signal observed by the principal. 
The purpose of this treatment is to provide the incremental effect of the coarse 
precision cost signal over the fine signal,  above, compared to the benchmark 
case in RSY [2003] no signal. Additionally, the incremental effect is important for 
comparison with the [OS] signal because here the option of choosing a signal is 
removed from the agent. Seeing the effect on agent report when he is forced to 
send the signal provides this experiment with increased information to gauge the 
effectiveness of giving the agent a choice of sending a cost signal.
In the third treatment,  option signal [OS], the agent submits his budget 
request and is given the option of sending a signal, s. The signal, if sent, must be 
truthful. The agent has the option to reveal within which quarter, which eighth of 
the distribution's support the actual cost lies, or to send no signal at all.5  Thus, 
the principal will observe both B and s or just B. The principal is made aware that 
the agent had the option of submitting the additional truthful signal. The principal 
will either reject or accept the project, paying B to the agent and collecting R if he 
accepts the project. 
Running these three treatments allows me to explore the following issues 
relating to budget mechanisms. The first issue is how a firm should organize its 
budgeting mechanisms  efficiently. In comparing the two always signal treatments 
([ASF] and [ASC]) with the [OS] treatment, I am able to assess, by comparing 
acceptance rates, whether it is more efficient to force an agent to report a cost 
5 Since the signal accuracy is based on increments that all break at 100, there is the potential 
that actual costs very close to 100 will cause the agent to choose to disclose no signal at all. 
Submitting a signal of any precision could severely limit the amount of slack that the agent is 
able to consume.
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signal  or  give  him  the  option  of  the  signal.  Also,  the  two  “always  signal” 
treatments allow an assessment of the effect of the precision of the cost signal. 
Further, these treatments provide insights into the most efficient reporting system 
for  both  parties  pecuniary  wealth  by  comparing  the  wealth  collected  in  the 
signaling cases with the no signal benchmark.
The second issue examines the agent's use of the cost signal as a means 
indicating to the principal that a high budget request was necessary because a 
high cost was observed. The principal could use the cost signal as a gauge for 
determining how fair the agent is being with his proposed slack sharing or as a 
method of trusting that the agent's high budget request is due to high cost. The 
comparison between the [OS] and [ASF], [ASC] offers insight into whether the 
agent  use  his  signal  only  to  get  a  project  approved  (a  strategic  motive)  or 
whether he is concerned with both project approval and creating the appearance 
of  fair  reporting,  which  puts  importance  on  both  strategic  and  non-strategic 
motivations. 
To  examine these two possibilities  I  analyze the  cost  observed by  the 
agent  in  each  treatment  and  compare  his  budget  requests  across  the  three 
signaling treatments. Also, given a particular cost, the agent's choice to use a 
cost signal (in the optional signal case) could provide additional insight. In the 
[ASC]  treatment,  an  agent  may forgo  the  appearance of  honesty  in  order  to 
capture  monetary  slack.  Since  the  appearance  of  honesty  likely  must  be 
accompanied by some pecuniary reward for the agent, his reports in the [ASC] 
treatment  will  begin  request  without  regard  for  the  cost  signal,  especially  as 
actual costs decrease. For example, if an agent observes an actual cost of 13 
and is forced to report a cost signal of [0-50], there is little monetary motivation to 
also  submit  a  budget  request  that  is  between  13  and  50  because  that  only 
provides  the  agent  with  meager  earning  in  a  low  cost  situation  (where  both 
parties could capture high earnings from the project). The agent will likely forgo 
his desire to report fairly and submit a budget request that exceeds the upper 
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limit of the cost signal.6 
For  each  signal  precision  and  budget  request  amount  in  the  optional 
signal, I compare the requests under the optional treatment to the results offered 
in the corresponding always signal system. For example, an agent who chooses 
a coarse cost signal in the optional signal case can be compared, by acceptance 
rates,  to  an  agent  in  the  always signal  coarse  treatment.  How these actions 
compare can explain the agent’s preferences towards strategic and non-strategic 
motivations and show how they change when the agent is given an option of 
choosing his cost signal.
The third issue concerns how the principal decides whether to approve 
projects,  knowing  the  agent  has  the  option  of  signaling.  By  comparing  the 
number  of  approvals  and  rejections  made  by  the  principal  across  the  three 
treatments, I am able to gauge the affect an optional signal has on the principal's 
project approval decision. For example, suppose an agent observes a cost of 45 
and chooses to request 185 with a coarse signal of [0,50]. The principal may 
treat this optional signal of [0,50] differently than the forced signal provided in the 
always  signal  coarse  treatment  although  the  information  within  the  signal  is 
exactly the same. This difference is due to the nature of the agent's choice to 
send a signal and provide the principal with additional information. 
Information sharing between the principal and agent could increase trust 
between the two parties and convince the principal to accept this project when 
she may have otherwise rejected it. As another example, the agent observes a 
cost  of  125 and wants  to  request  150.  In  the  absence of  a  cost  signal,  the 
principal  may not be able to  trust  that  the agent  had a cost  close to 150 as 
opposed to a cost that was near 0. The inclusion of a coarse cost signal of [101-
150] shows the principal that the agent had observed a cost that would justify 
requesting 150. Therefore, the cost signal increases the principal's trust in the 
agent. The comparison explores how the principal utilizes a signal that the agent 
6 I assume that both the principal and agent will view a budget report that is within the cost 
signal as honest.
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has no choice but  to send versus one that he sent by choice.  Because the 
choice  of  signaling  indicates  additional  information  about  the  non-pecuniary 
motivations  of  the  agent,  utilizing  an  optional  signal  scheme may result  in  a 
higher number of project approvals.
The fourth issue comes from comparing the principal's decision under the 
RSY no  announcement case to the [OS] treatment where the agent chooses to 
send no signal. In the RSY no announcement case, the agent has no option of 
sending  any  additional  cost  signal.  By  comparing  the  requests  in  the  [OS] 
treatment that lack a signal to the RSY benchmark case, I can discover the value 
that  the  principal  puts  on  optional  information  (even  though  no  additional 
information was received)  and if  that  withholding leads the principal  to  reject 
projects that would have been accepted if the choice to signal was not present. 
For  example,  suppose  the  agent  observes  an  actual  cost  of  45  and,  in  the 
optional signal treatment, sends a budget request of 165 without any cost signal. 
Prior research has suggested that requests  of 165 are usually accepted but the 
principal may be hesitant to accept this request because it lacks any cost signal 
and implies that the agent is withholding information to get more slack from the 
principal.7 In other words, the principal is hesitant at the lack of a signal being 
provided by the agent and may suspect the agent of being unfair because they 
chose to send no signal (in the example above, the agent could be considered 
unfair). In comparing these three treatments and the RSY no signal case, this 
study can isolate the effects that a budget mechanism and an optional choice 
can have on agency efficiency.
IV. Hypotheses
With the previous issues in mind, I present seven hypotheses. The first is 
derived from previous budgeting experiments that  have shown that non-trivial 
portions of economically profitable projects will be rejected. Although it is always 
in the best interest of the principal to approve all projects, she still rejects some 
projects on the basis that they are unfair distributions of wealth. While irrational 
7 See SSWY for verification.
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under an assumption of wealth maximization, the rejection of perceived-to-be-
unfair offers aids in framing an understanding of the non-pecuniary motives at 
play in this scenario. Therefore, my first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1 [H1]: Under all the [ASF], [ASC] and [OS] treatments 
a non-trivial portion of budget requests will be rejected.
The second is that a greater proportion of high-cost projects will be funded 
with the introduction and use of the cost signal. When the agent is faced with a 
high cost, he will be able to send a verifiable cost signal along with his budget 
request. While the principal would generally reject a high request, she will  be 
better  informed  by  the  signaling  mechanism  and,  in  utilizing  all  available 
information, will be able to see that the offer, although high, is a fair request from 
the agent. For example, suppose that actual cost is very high, say 188 and that 
no cost signal was available to the agent. In this case the agent is likely to be 
afraid that any budget proposal, even one that provides very little personal slack, 
will get rejected by the principal on grounds that it is unfair and that the agent is 
being very selfish and unfair. 
By incorporating a cost signal in with his report, the agent can provide the 
principal with enough information to distinguish a high request that resulted from 
a high-cost state from a high request where the agent is being selfish and unfair. 
To the principal, a cost signal indicates an additional bit of information that can be 
used to gauge the agent's request. With the cost signal, the principal is better 
able to judge fair and unfair cost requests. This situation leads to less information 
asymmetry  about  the  agent's  intentions  for  the  principal  and should  cause a 
higher number of request approvals.
Hypothesis 2 [H2]:  The existence of the cost signal will lead to a 
greater frequency of approvals for high cost requests compared to 
the  RSY benchmark.  This  effect  should be equally  strong in  the 
[ASF],  [ASC] and [OS] treatments because the agents should be 
inclined to send cost signal information in the high-cost case (actual 
costs between 160 and 200).
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The  third  and  fourth  hypotheses  compare  rejection  rates  among  [OS], 
[ASF], [ASC], and [NS] RSY benchmark. Under the [ASF] treatment, the agent is 
more likely to report inside of the cost signals range. Much like the HRT results, 
even  in  cases  where  the  agent  has  strong  incentive  to  make  high  budget 
requests and capture larger amounts of slack, the agent may not do so, because 
reporting  outside  the  cost  signal  may  imply  unfairness  to  the  principal.   For 
example, when actual costs are 89, the agent is aware that the signal that will 
accompany his request will indicate that actual costs were between 76 and 100. 
Although the agent in the absence of a signal would like to request approximately 
150, he may feel he is better off submitting a request that is close 100 for fear of 
being perceived as unfair due to the signal sent to the principal.  
From the principal's perspective, any budget request outside the signal's 
range could indicate unfairness by the agent and, depending on her threshold for 
fairness, could be rejected by the principal. Knowing that this is a possibility, the 
agent is likely to submit budget requests that are closer to his cost signals and 
more of his requests should therefore be approved. When the agent is forced to 
submit a coarse signal in the [ASC] treatment, the agent is better able to make 
requests  within  the  cost  signals  range  without  facing  as  much  pressure  of 
rejection due to the principal's preferences towards fairness. Given the easing of 
the pecuniary motivation to misrepresent,  the [ASC] treatment may see fewer 
reports outside of the signal range and the principal will  have more reason to 
approve projects.
Under the [OS] treatment, the agent will send precise signals in the high-
cost range (in order to get his projects approved) and the signal he sends will 
become coarser as costs decrease because the agent will not feel as inclined to 
indicate  a  high-cost  state  to  get  his  project  approved.  Due  to  this  gradual 
decrease  in  precision  will  limit  the  accuracy  of  information  available  to  the 
principal, the agent will be better able to send requests without cost signals that 
appeal  to  the  principal's  first-order  preferences  for  monetary  wealth  without 
having  as  much  pressure  of  rejection  from  the  principal's  second-order 
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preferences towards fairness. In either case, each treatment will  have a lower 
rejection  rate  than  the  [NS]  benchmark.  Therefore  our  third  and  fourth 
hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 3 [H3]: The [OS], [ASF] and [ASC] treatments will have 
a lower frequency of rejection than the [NS] benchmark.
Hypothesis  4  [H4]: The [ASC]  and [ASF]  treatments  will  have a 
higher frequency of rejection than the [OS] treatment.
Closely related to hypothesis 2, above, is the case where costs are low, a 
cost  signal  is  being  used,  and  the  agent  still  requests  a  high  amount.  For 
example, the agent views a cost of 35 and is in the always signal fine treatment. 
In  this  case,  the  agent  has  to  send  a  cost  signal  of  [26-50]  but,  the  agent 
requests 175 from the principal. The principal observes both the cost signal and 
the agent's request, which are contradictory. For the principal, this contradiction 
implies that the agent is being unfair with his budget request and she may be 
more likely to reject this investment. 
This situation should also arise in the ASC treatment but  not in the OS 
treatment. This assumption is based on the idea that the agent could choose to 
send no signal if they wanted to request significantly outside the cost signal. I 
hypothesize that the principal will reject such requests more often than when no 
signal was sent. Whereas information asymmetry exists in a no signal treatment, 
an agent being forced to send a signal has more information symmetry with the 
principal and will find that high budget requests that are not accompanied with 
high cost signals will be rejected more often.
Hypothesis 5 [H5]: When the agent sends budget requests that are 
significantly higher than the cost signals (more than one quarter of 
the cost distribution different), there will be a greater frequency of 
rejections than when requests are less than 50 different from the 
cost  signal.  This  effect  will  be  strongest  in  the  [ASC]  treatments 
because the agent is forced to send a cost signal that already has a 
wide range for misrepresentation.
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The  sixth  hypothesis  pertains  to  the  [OS]  treatment.  As  actual  costs 
decrease, the agent will  send signals that are less precise. This situation will 
continue until the most extreme case is reached in the lowest section of possible 
costs (between 0 and 20 actual cost). In the highest cost situations (between 180 
and 200 actual cost),  the agent is likely to send the most precise cost signal 
along with his budget request, because without the additional signal the principal 
is likely to reject the budget request. 
As the actual costs decrease, the agent is less inclined to use a precise 
cost signal because, from the agent's perspective, it is unnecessary to send a 
cost signal if his budget request is relatively low and still provides him with a fair 
amount of slack. It is thus very unlikely that the agent would send a precise cost 
signal and admit that his slack consuming budget request is a misrepresentation 
of actual cost and could be viewed as unfair by the principal. In other words, the 
agent  will  allow  the  information  asymmetry  to  increase  as  costs  decrease 
because his budget requests will be low enough that they offer the agent a fair 
amount of profit and the agent does not want to over inform that principal as to 
convince her that he is being unfair. 
However, there is a drawback to the agent of having optional signals for 
the agent available. Suppose the agent makes a somewhat high budget proposal 
(145),  a  proposal  that  normally  would  be  accepted  without  the  availability  of 
signals. The principal might be expecting a signal that indicated that the actual 
cost was at least moderately high, either a coarse signal of [101-150] or a fine 
signal of [101-125] or [126-150]. Otherwise she might suspect that the agent is 
attempting to exploit his informational advantage by asking for a lot of funding 
when the actual cost is quite low. Knowing that the principal is expecting some 
indication of actual cost, the agent is inclined to send a coarse cost signal in an 
effort  to appease the principal's  desire for  information in making his approval 
decision. This change in signaling behavior by the agent brought on by the option 
to send the verifiable signal may cause the agent to submit the coarse cost signal 
until the actual costs are low enough that any reasonable budget request will be 
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accepted.
Hypothesis 6 [H6]: In the [OS] treatment the agent will accompany 
their request with the most precise signal possible in the highest 
cost range (actual costs between 175 and 200). As costs decrease, 
the agent will send coarser and coarser signals, until actual cost is 
in the lowest tenth of the distribution, and then he will send no cost 
signal with his request.
The seventh hypothesis is that the principal will reject more proposals that 
lack  a  cost  signal  in  the  [OS]  treatment  than  in  the  RSY benchmark  case. 
Knowing that the agent had the option of sending a cost signal and decided not 
to will be an important indication for rejection by the principal. Because the agent 
neglected  to  provide  the  principal  with  a  metric  to  judge  the  fairness  of  his 
request, the principal is more likely to assume that the agent is being unfair and 
reject his request. I believe that this outcome will happen more often then when 
no signal  requests are made in the RSY benchmark case. Essentially, the choice 
not  to  send  a  signal  will  be  interpreted  by  the  principal  as  an  indication  of 
misrepresentation by  the  agent.  This  will  lead to  a  requested amount  that  is 
approved in the RSY [NS] case being rejected when submitted in the [OS] case 
without a signal.
Hypothesis 7 [H7]:  The lack of a signal in the [OS] treatment will 
lead to a higher frequency of rejections than similar requests in the 
RSY [NS] case.
V. Results and Discussion:
One session was run for each of the three treatment using undergraduate 
students from The Ohio State University. The total number of participants (agents 
and principals) were 18, 20, and 22 for  Always Signal Coarse, Always Signal  
Fine, and Optional Signal, respectively.  In each session, 15 rounds of play were 
administered,  with  each  round  consisting  of  a  single  investment.  After  each 
round, participants were re-paired randomly. Sessions lasted ninety minutes and 
average monetary payment for participating was $16.44, which included a $10 
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show-up fee.8 Participants were paid in private at the end of the experiment.
Table 1, above, provides summary statistics of all rounds for all costs. The 
total number of projects was 9(15) = 135 for [ASC], 10(15) = 150 for [ASF], and 
11(15) = 165 for [OS]. Although not statistically significant, acceptance rates are 
greatest  for  the [ASF]  treatment  as opposed to my hypotheses that  the [OS] 
treatment  would  lead  to  the  highest  rate  of  acceptance.  Consistent  with  my 
expectations, the [OS] treatment has fewer rejections than in the [ASC] treatment 
and by a greater margin than between the [OS] and [ASF] treatments. I believe 
that the agent had to spend time learning how to use the cost signal that led to 
lower  rates  of  acceptance.  I  explore  this  issue  more  throughly  later  in  this 
analysis.
Directly  related  to  [H1],  I  find  that  all  three  treatments  had  mean 
acceptance rates that were significantly less than 1 (perfect approval). For each 
treatment, we reject the null hypotheses of acceptance rates equal to 1 (all one-
tailed  p-values  where  less  than  0.001).  Therefore,  this  data  suggests  that 
principals still reject otherwise profitable offers and are including non-pecuniary 
motivations in their investment decisions. 
Tables 2a to 2b, below, display the analysis on acceptance rates by cost 
8 The subjects were told about a $5 show-up fee as per the instructions included herein. Due to 
a computer error during the first session, subjects received additional payments of $5 in an 
attempt to keep monetary payments equal across sessions. Subjects from the first session 
were paid for the experimental rounds up to the crash, which averaged about $5.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
n Cost
ASF 150
96.82 157.86 0.813** 0.56 0.44
(56.89) (28.43) (0.39) (0.09) (0.09)
ASC 135
98.12 150.53 0.711** 0.5 0.5
(55.989) (37.89) (0.45) (0.18) (0.18)
OS 165
97.55 146.98 0.769** 0.45 0.55
(57.22) (37.22) (0.42) (0.18) (0.18)
NS* 510
98.52 162.06 0.661** 0.59 0.41
(59) (24.03) (0.47) (0.17) (0.17)
Cells contain means and standard deviations in parentheses
* Data is from RSY [2003]










ranges between each treatment. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the existence of a 
cost signal would lead to more approvals in the highest cost region compared to 
the RSY benchmark. As Table 2a indicates, mean acceptance rates for all three 
treatments were significantly greater than the no-signal benchmark when costs 
were greater than 160 (0.6207, 0.4615, 0.4545, and 0.2353 for ASF, ASC, OS, 
and NS respectively). 
   To analyze [H2] further, I performed a series of one-tailed t-test comparing 
the mean acceptance rates of each treatment for three cost regions (costs 
greater than 160, costs between 160 and 120, and costs less than 120). Although 
not significant in all cases, the existence of a signal did lead to higher approvals 
of high-cost projects. For the highest cost region (160 and above), all three 
treatments had significantly greater mean acceptance rate than the NS 
benchmark case (t-statistics of 4.145, 2.321, and 2.451 for [ASF], [ASC], and 




Costs >=160 1.18 0.12 51.98 ASC
Costs 120-160 2.24*** 0.014*** 56
p-valueCosts <120 0.53 0.3 163.6
OS
Costs >=160 1.31 0.098 59.3 0.05 0.48 53.7 OS
Costs 120-160 0.7 0.23 60.9 -1.55 0.063** 59
p-valueCosts <120 -0.22 0.41 185.3 -0.75 0.23 161.6
NS*
Costs >=160 4.15*** 129 2.32*** 0.01*** 126 2.45*** 0.008*** 133
Costs 120-160 2.92*** 0.002*** 129 0.25 0.4 42.9 2.19*** 0.015*** 132
Costs <120 0.62 0.25 157.2 -0.02 0.49 124.9 0.93 0.18 404
* Data is provided by the RSY no-communication treatment
** Denotes Significance at 85% confidence (p-value <0.075)
*** Denotes Significance at 95% confidence (p-value <0.025)
Null Hypothesis: Mean 









Table 2a: Acceptance Rates by Cost Summary
Region I Region II Region III
Costs >=160 Costs 120>=x<160 Costs <120





t ASF 29 .6207 191 30 .8333 177 91 .8681 141
ASC 26 .4615 192 28 .5714 171 81 .8395 130
OS 33 .4545 188 33 .7576 166 99 .8788 127
NS* 102 .2353 188 101 .5446 171 307 .8404 151
* Data is provided by the RSY no-communication treatment
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[OS] respectively). Based on these findings, I support [H2]s claim that the 
existence of a cost signal leads to more approvals in the high cost cases.
Using a post-hoc questionnaire given after all the decision rounds, I asked 
participants  to  indicate  their  preference  for  various  statements  (a  copy  is 
contained in appendix B). Participants were given a set of statements and asked 
to choose, on a seven point scale, whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement (1 was completely disagreed, 4 was neutral,  and 7 was completely 
agree). Table 3a, below, and Table 3b, below, contains the mean responses for 
each player type by treatment.
   One motivation I suggested for [H2] was that the agent could use the cost 
signal to help ease the information asymmetry and moral hazard problem when 
faced with a high cost. Question three asks the principal whether a high budget 
Table 3b: Questionnaire Mean Responses by Treatment
Agent Questions
QA QB QC QD QE QF
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
TREATMENT
ASF 4.9000 3.3000 3.7000 2.1000 4.5000 2.4000
ASC 5.1111 3.8889 4.8889 2.6667 4.6667 2.7778
OS 4.4545 4.0909 4.2727 2.9091 4.8182 2.2727
TOTAL: 4.8219 3.7599 4.2872 2.5586 4.6616 2.4835
QA: I wanted to leave the other player with a fair amount of profit.
QB: I wanted to report honestly to the other player.
QC: I used the cost signal as a means of indicating my honest reporting.
QD: I cared about sending a budget report that was within the cost signal's range.
QE: The possibility that the other player could reject a project kept my budget request conservative
QF: I did not consider the other player's profit when making my budget request.
Table 3a: Questionnaire Mean Responses by Treatment
Principal Questions 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
TREATMENT
ASF 5.3000 4.0000 6.0000 3.5000 5.1000
ASC 3.3333 4.0000 5.3333 3.7778 4.0000
OS 5.2727 3.7273 5.1818 4.0909 4.7273
TOTAL: 4.6354 3.9091 5.5051 3.7896 4.6091
Q1: The other player's request had to provide a fair allocation of profit for me to approve the project
Q2: If the other player did not include a cost signal, I was more likely to reject the project
Q4: If the other player's budget request was outside of the cost signal, I was more likely to reject.
Q5: I used my power of rejection to punish the other player for unfair budget requests.
Q3: If a high budget request from the other player was coupled with a cost signal indicated a high 
actual cost, I was still willing to approve the project even though it offered me very little profit.
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request  that  was  coupled  with  a  cost  signal  indicating  high  cost  would  be 
approved  even  though  the  request  offered  very  little  monetary  incentive.  I 
performed a one-sample t-test on the mean response for all treatments (5.501) 
using the null hypothesis that the mean was equal to 4 (neutral) and rejected the 
null  hypothesis at the 95% level (t-statistic of 4.901). Additionally, I  performed 
three  one-sample  t-tests  on  each  of  the  treatments  for  this  question  and 
discovered that all three treatments achieved at least 90% confidence (t-statistics 
of  4.243,  2.066,  and 2.358 for  ASF,  ASC, and OS respectively).  This  finding 
further suggests that the existence of the cost signal led to higher approval rates 
for high cost projects. Based on these findings, I further support [H2].
 [H3] compares the acceptance rates between the treatments and the RSY 
benchmark case. The overall acceptance rates for the three treatments and the 
RSY  benchmark  are  contained  in  Table  1,  above.  Using  a  one-way  t-test, 
treatments ASF and OS have acceptance rates that are significant at the 95% 
level  (t-statics of  3.598 and 2.633 for  ASF and OS respectively)  and are not 
significant for the ASC treatment (t-statistic of 1.106). The results for the ASF and 
OS treatments were as predicted but, not for the ASC treatment. I believe that 
this is driven by the lack information precision included in the coarse cost signal. 
Notice  that  mean  acceptances  in  ASC  dramatically  dropped  between 
regions II and III (0.84 to 0.57). This drop implies that the principal is not satisfied 
with the information content of the agent's cost signal as costs increase and are 
less willing to approve projects. Additionally, the region III mean acceptance rate 
for ASC is slightly less than the NS benchmark (0.8395 compared to 0.8404 for 
ASC and NS). This result also supports my explanation for the contradiction in 
the ASC results. Despite these limitations, this test still provides overall support 
for [H3] and indicates that the existence of a cost signal leads to more approvals 
than in a no-signal setting conditional on the information content of the signal.
 In  [H4],  I  predicted  that  the  OS  treatment  would  lead  to  the  highest 
acceptance rate among the three treatments. Instead of the predicted outcome, 
the ASF treatment had the highest acceptance rate (81%). To better understand 
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how the agent's report depended on the actual cost, I split the treatments into 
three cost groups that are disclosed in Tables 2a to 2b, above. It is important to 
note that the OS treatment did have the lowest mean budget request in every 
cost region. This result implies that the agent sends lower budget requests when 
given the option of a signal. This finding is especially important to productive and 
social efficiency because lower requests are both more likely to get approved 
and provide both parties with a more equal share of total slack.
The acceptance rate  for  the  OS treatment  dramatically  increased from 
region I to region II and caused the acceptance rate for OS to be significantly 
greater  than  the  ASC  treatment  (t-statistic  1.55).  As  discussed  later  in  this 
analysis,  this increase is due to the agent's effective use of the optional cost 
signals in the high cost regions. This efficiency allowed the agent to reduce the 
information asymmetry between him and the principal and led to a higher number 
of  approvals.  Despite  this  increase,  the  ASF  treatment  still  has  the  highest 
acceptance rates in each cost region. Based on this data, I reject hypothesis four 
[H4] because  the  ASF treatment  and  not  the  OS treatment  had  the  highest 
acceptance rate. 
[H5] predicts that budget requests that are significantly outside the cost 
signal will face a higher frequency of rejection. To better analyze this hypothesis, 
I controlled for the agent's request and then determined if that request was within 
50 of the cost signal. That data is disclosed in Table 4, below. The OS treatment 
was excluded because there  were  very  few instances of  the  budget  request 
being more than 50 different from the cost signal sent. To appropriately analyze 
this hypothesis, I first examine whether requesting significantly outside the cost 
signal  leads to  more rejections and then compare between the treatments to 
determine if the effect is stronger in the ASC treatment.
Bowen - 26
 For  the  both  treatments,  the  results  are  generally  predicted  by  my 
hypothesis. When sending a budget request that was more 50 different from the 
cost signal, the investment was rejected more often than when the request was 
within 50 of the cost signal. Graph 1, below, offers a visual representation of the 
effect of requesting within 50 of the cost signal compared to when the agent's 
request  was more than 50 different  than the cost  signal.  From this  analysis, 
requesting significantly outside the cost signal led to greater rejections by the 
principal.
 When considering whether the effect of sending a request that is more 
than 50 greater than the cost signal is stronger in ASC than ASF, I compare the 
means within each request region for each treatment. The differences between 
mean acceptance rates within each ASF request region are 0 (1.00 – 1.00 for the 
<100 region), 0 (1.00 – 1.00 for the 101-125 region), 0.22 (1.00 – 0.88 for the 
Table 4: Mean Acceptance Rates by Request closeness to Cost Signal
Request <100 Requests 101 - 125 Requests 126 - 150 Requests 151 - 175 Requests >175 Total
N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR
Treat Request within 50 of the Upper Bound of Cost Signal Range
ASF 2 1.00 2 1.00 15 1.00 23 0.91 44 0.66 86 0.80
ASC 16 1.00 6 0.83 19 0.95 33 0.67 30 0.50 104 0.73
Treat Request greater than 50 different than the Upper Bound of Cost Signal Range
ASF 3 1.00 20 1.00 24 0.88 12 0.58 5 0.40 64 0.83
ASC - - 11 0.91 8 0.50 11 0.55 1 0.00 31 0.65







Graph 1: Mean AR by Request and Cost Signal around 50
ASF within 50
ASC within 50
ASF outside by 50














126-150 region), 0.33 (0.91 – 0.58 for the 151-175 region), and .26 (0.66 – 0.40 
for  the  176-200  region),  which  is  a  mean  difference  of  0.162.  Whereas  the 
differences between mean acceptance rates for each ASC request region are 
-0.08, 0.45, 0.12, and 0.50 (I excluded the <100 region because no data exists 
for the agent requesting outside the cost signal by 50 for the ASC treatment), 
which is a mean difference of 0.248. These differences suggest that the effect of 
getting  more  rejections  for  requesting  significantly  outside  the  cost  signal  is 
greater in the ASC treatment. From the principal's perspective, a request that is 
at great odds with the cost signal would indicate that the agent is over-requesting 
in an attempt to gain excess slack from the investment. Considering the wide 
distribution of the coarse signal, it makes sense that the principal would be more 
willing to reject requests over 50 different from the coarse cost signal.
To further understand the threshold effect of requesting outside the cost 
signal, I ran the same analysis as above except that I changed the cutoff from 50 
to 25. The results form this analysis are contained in Table 5, above. Using the 
25 cutoff, the effect in the ASF treatment appears to be the same, although there 
is limited data for the lower request regions. For the ASC treatment, the effect is 
far less pronounced and, in the middle request regions, requests that differ by 
more than 25 have higher acceptance rates than those within 25 of the signal. 
This  effect  is  graphically  represented in  Graph 2,  below.  These contradicting 
results could be driven by a tendency for agents in the ASC treatment to send 
requests that are greater than 25 from the cost signal but less than 50. Within 
this  requesting  area,  principal's  are  still  very  likely  to  accept  a  reasonable 
request,  which  the  middle  request  regions  represent  (the  principal  is  getting 
Table 5: Mean Acceptance Rates by Request closeness to Cost Signal
Request <100 Requests 101 - 125 Requests 126 - 150 Requests 151 - 175 Requests >175 Total
N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR N Mean AR
Treat Request within 25 of the Upper Bound of Cost Signal Range
ASF - - - - 2 1.00 12 0.92 33 0.67 47 0.75
ASC 11 1.00 6 0.83 4 0.75 33 0.67 28 0.50 82 0.67
Treat Request greater than 25 different than the Upper Bound of Cost Signal Range
ASF 5 1.00 22 1.00 37 0.92 23 0.74 16 0.56 103 0.84
ASC 5 1.00 11 0.91 23 0.83 11 0.55 3 0.33 53 0.77
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between 99 and 50, if the projected is accepted). This conclusion is supported by 
the severe decrease in acceptances for the requests differing by more than 25 in 
the higher request regions of the ASC treatment. 
    Chart 1, below, shows the signal use from the [OS] treatment for each 
eighth of the cost distribution. This data provides support for [H6] because, the 
agent sends the fine signal more often in the high cost cases. As costs decrease, 
the agent sends more coarse signals and then, with costs less than 100, they 
send no signal with an overwhelming majority. Furthermore, the agent utilizes the 
limited information contained in the coarse in a way that is more efficient than this 
hypothesis predicts. The use of the coarse signal is favored in the 175-151 cost 
range, which could suggest that the agents are sending coarse information at an 
inappropriate cost level. Instead, sending a coarse signal in this range ensures 
that the agent's request will be within the signal that he sends. For example, 
sending a coarse signal for an actual cost of 167 means that the principal 
observes [151-200], which would encompass any possible budget request. Using 
the coarse signal in this way provides the principal with just enough information 
for her to see that the agent observed a high cost. In a setting where the fineness 
of the signal indicates more work for a firm's internal auditor, this use of a coarse 
signal in a relatively high cost setting would be an efficient allocation of the firm's 







Graph 2: Mean AR by Requests and Cost Signal around 25
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resources. Based on this analysis, I find that the data supports hypothesis six 
[H6].
 Additionally, the agent reverted to mostly using the fine signal in the 150-
126 cost range. At first glance, this appears to be a contradiction to hypothesis 
six. Instead, I propose that this increase is due to a “boundary effect” that arises 
due to the cutoffs for the fine signal. When the cost is in the upper half of a 
coarse signal's distribution (as is the case for costs between 150-126), the agent 
may be using the fine signal to give the principal a better understanding about 
costs so that they can capture more budget slack without appearing unfair. For 
example, compare the options available to the agent when actual cost is 126 
versus 125. In the 126 case, the agent could send a coarse signal of [101-150] 
and could assume that the principal would estimate that actual cost is around 
125 (one half of the costs signal range) or the agent could send a fine signal of 
[126-150] and could assume that the principal would estimate that actual cost is 
around 138 (one half of the cost signal range). By using the fine signal, the agent 
can increase his budget request without making the principal think he is being 







Chart 1: [OS] Signal Use by Cost Range






greedy or unfair. Alternatively, using the coarse signal would force the agent to be 
more  conservative  with  his  budget  request  so  as  still  to  appear  fair  to  the 
principal because the principal's estimation about actual cost is lower. In the 125 
case, the use of a fine signal decreases the principal's estimate about actual cost 
and is therefore less attractive for the 101-125 cost range.
[H7] predicted that an agent who did not include a cost signal would 
have their investment rejected by the principal more often than in similar cases 
where no signal was possible. To better analyze this hypothesis, I controlled for 
the  agent's  request  (in  ranges)  and  compared  the  mean  acceptance  rates 
between the OS treatment (with no signal sent) and the NS benchmark. 
Table 6, above, shows the result of that analysis and provides support for 
my  hypothesis. For every request range, the agents that sent no signal in the 
optional  signal  treatment  had  a  lower  acceptance  rate  than  in  the  no  signal 
benchmark. More interesting to this analysis is which requests the agent sends in 
the OS treatment with no signal sent compared to the NS benchmark. In the no 
signal benchmark, agent's chose to send high budget requests 58% of the time 
but, in the optional signal treatment when no signal was sent, this request was 
only chosen 14% of the time. Instead, agents in the OS case recognized the 
negative image associated with sending no signal and requesting a high amount 
when the principal is aware that a cost signal was an option. When no signal was 
sent  (and  the  option  to  send  was  present),  the  agent  requests  a  more 
Table 6: Mean AR in OS No-Signal v. NS Benchmark
NS Benchmark






ge 200 - 161 0.27 11 14% 0.48 294 58%
160 121 0.86 50 65% 0.90 194 38%
<120 1 16 21% 1 22 4%
Total 0.81 77 - 0.66 510 -
OS Treatment with no 
signal sent
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conservative amount  of  slack.  This  results  suggests  that  giving an  agent  the 
option of sending a signal can cause him to lower requests regardless of whether 
he chooses to utilize the signal or not.
To further understand how the agent is using the cost signal in the 
optional signal treatment, I controlled for both cost and request and analyzed the 
type of signal used in each case. The results of this analysis are contained in 
Table 7, below.
  This table provides additional support for the ideas discussed in analyzing 
hypothesis six and also provides additional insights into how the agent engages 
in image management. When the cost is between 151 and 176, the agent sends 
a coarse signal in most cases and requests in the upper portion of that signal. 
This implies that the agent is using the optional signal efficiently and uses the 
coarse signal's incomplete information to capture additional slack. Also, the 126 
to 150 cost range has the agent mostly using the fine signal  and requesting 
within  25  of  that  signal.  So,  the  fine  signal  is  used  by  the  agent  to  reduce 
information  asymmetry  and  is  beneficial  to  the  principal  because the  agent's 
requests are tethered to that cost signal.
In the 101 to 125 cost range, the use of the fine signal when the agent 
requested within that range suggest that the agent is participating in some image 
Table 7: Optional Signal use by Cost and Request
Requests Are Between









0 # of NS 0 # of NS 2 # of NS 0 # of NS
1 # of FS 0 # of FS 0 # of FS 0 # of FS
0 # of CS 8 # of CS 5 # of CS 1 # of CS
126-150
0 # of NS 7 # of NS 1 # of NS
5 # of FS 12 # of FS 0 # of FS
0 # of CS 0 # of CS 0 # of CS
151-175
1 # of NS 1 # of NS
0 # of FS 4 # of FS
3 # of CS 15 # of CS
176-200
1 # of NS
12 # of FS
1 # of CS
NS = No signal, FS = Fine signal, CS = Coarse signal
Bowen - 32
management. The use of any signal when costs are that low is unexpected and 
the only plausible reason that an agent would use the fine signal in this case 
would be to show the principal what a nice person he is. It is also important to 
note that the principal utilizes the coarse signal in the 126 to 150 and 151 to 175 
request ranges in a manner that allows him to increase the principal's estimation 
about actual cost and capture additional slack.
Another complexity that I  have yet to analyze is the effect that random 
repairing may have on the OS treatment. In all treatments, agents are randomly 
repaired with different principals after every decision round. As Table 8 shows for 
the  OS treatment,  each  principal  exhibits  a  different  type  when making  their 
investment decision. For example, principals 7, 11, and 21 only rejected 1 project 
in all 15 rounds of play. For an agent that was randomly paired with these three 
principals, his use of a cost signal might not be important for getting his project 
approved but, when he is randomly repaired for the next round, his new principal 
pairing could put more weight on the cost signal when  making their investment 
decision. Therefore, it is harder for agents to learn how to effectively utilize the 
cost signal because the agent's use depends on how he believes the principal 
will use a cost signal and the principal's type of play is an important component 
that is unknown to the agent.
 Table 8 also includes the principle mean acceptances for the ASF and 
OS Treatment ASF Treatment ASC Treatment
Reject Accept AR Reject Accept AR Reject Accept AR









1 4 11 0.73 5 10 0.67 0 15 1.00
3 2 13 0.87 2 13 0.87 0 15 1.00
5 8 7 0.47 4 11 0.73 8 7 0.47
7 1 14 0.93 3 12 0.80 0 15 1.00
9 8 7 0.47 0 15 1.00 5 10 0.67
11 1 14 0.93 2 13 0.87 7 8 0.53
13 2 13 0.87 5 10 0.67 4 11 0.73
15 5 10 0.67 3 12 0.80 7 8 0.53
17 4 11 0.73 1 14 0.93 8 7 0.47
19 2 13 0.87 3 12 0.80 - - -
21 1 14 0.93 - - - - - -




ASC treatments. Although these types do not have any affect on signal use, the 
importance  of  principal  type  to  the  amount  requested  would  be  similar.  In 
comparison,  the  ASC  treatment  had  the  most  habitual  approvers  and  more 
principals who rejected about 50% of the investments they were presented with. 
These principal types may have led to the decreased approval rates in the ASC 
treatment. 
For  the  OS  treatment,  these  challenges  to  agent  learning  give  more 
meaning to the results displayed in table 7 provide additional evidence that the 
strategic use of the signal survived, despite issues of principal type (for example 
always approvers). Additionally, I analyzed how the agent used the cost signal in 
the  first  three  rounds  of  the  experiment  compared to  the  remaining  decision 
rounds. These results are contained in Table 9, below.
 As I predicted, the agent faces a certain amount of learning on how to use 
the cost signal. The data suggests that the agent overuses sending no signal in 
the first three rounds and, as the decision rounds continue, learns how to more 
effectively use his cost signal options. The coupling of the principal type playing, 
dependent  on  cost  signal  sent,  and  the  agent's  learning  process  in  the  first 
rounds of the experiment can help to explain why the OS treatment had a lower 
mean acceptance rate than the ASF treatment. These effects were not as strong 
in either always signal treatment because the principal did not have to take the 
agent's choice of signaling into consideration for her investment decision.
Table 9: Cost Signal Use by Round
Last 12 Rounds





al No signal 17 52% 60 46%
6 18% 41 31%
Fine Signal 10 30% 31 24%







I conducted an experiment designed to investigate the effect of a verifiable 
cost signal and an agent's optional use of that signal in a budgeting setting. This 
setting  incorporates  many  key  elements  of  budgeting  settings  including: 
information  asymmetry,  limited  liability  of  employees,  and  limitations  on 
commitment by superiors.  Within this setting, I  administered three treatments: 
[ASF] Always Signal Fine, wherein the agent has to include a truthful cost signal 
that indicates which eighth of  the cost  distribution the actual  cost  lies,  [ASC] 
Always Signal Coarse, wherein the agent has to include a truthful cost signal that 
indicates  which  quarter  of  the cost  distribution  the actual  cost  lies,  and [OS] 
Optional Signal, wherein the agent has the option of including either a fine signal, 
a  coarse  signal,  or  no  signal.  For  my  analysis,  I  was  able  to  use  the  data 
gathered during the RSY no-announcement treatment as a benchmark [NS] no-
signal case.
This study has four main findings:
1. That the existence of a cost signal leads to a higher number of approvals 
when actual costs are high.
2. That, when given many signaling options, the agent strategically chooses 
the  signal  that  is  appropriate  for  observed  cost  in  order  to  get  the 
investment approved. This includes both the use of the fine signal in the 
high cost case and the use of no signal when costs are low.
3. That  forcing  an  agent  to  signal  provides  the  principal  with  enough 
information  to  set  a  maximum  amount  over  the  cost  signal  that  the 
principal sees as unfair. I found that this signal exists at approximately 50 
greater than the upper bound of the cost signal.
4. That, when an agent has the option of signaling and chooses not to, the 
agent  also  sends  a  lower  budget  request  then  when  no  signal  was 
possible.
The  first  findings  effect  was  strongest  for  the  ASF  treatment  and  has 
impacts  for  the  overall  social  efficiency  that  is  possible  by  utilizing  a  cost 
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signaling mechanism. It is important to note that this effect was not statistically 
significant for the ASC treatment and indicates that the range around cost of the 
signal  being  sent  is  important,  especially  in  the  high  cost  case.  The second 
finding  supports  the  notion  that  agents  are  able  to  understand  that  strategic 
elements of a cost signal and use them in budgeting. The best display of this 
efficiency is when the agent chooses to send a coarse signal when costs are 
between 151 and 176 because doing so allows his request to be within the signal 
without providing the principal with excessive information.
The  third  finding  indicates  that  the  cost  signal  serves  a  monitoring 
mechanism for the principal and she is able to make her investment decision 
contingent on both the signal and the agent's request. Assuming that a firm had 
resources in place to force agents to send verifiable cost signals, such as internal 
audit  departments,   the  enforcement of  such a  signaling  scheme could  keep 
agent requests within a reasonable amount of the cost signal. The fourth finding 
suggests that giving the agent the option of signaling causes him to be more 
conservative with his requests when he chooses not to utilize the optional signal. 
This result implies that, even though an option is not pursued, the fact that the 
option was available  was common knowledge had an effect on agent behavior. 
This is a important finding of this study and needs to be analyzed further.
My study adds to the ongoing work in using budgeting studies to explore 
the  conflict  between  standard  agency  assumptions  and  the  addition  of  non-
pecuniary  motivations  in  hopes of  improving  our  knowledge of  the budgeting 
process.  This  study  highlights  the  potential  importance  that  verifiable  and 
optional cost signals can make in improving budgeting scenarios. One possible 
extension of this work would be to include treatments where the agent has the 
choice between no signal and each signal, individually. Further studies in this 
area should explore the continued choice of the agent beyond just two signals 
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Appendix A: Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Your pay will 
depend on the decisions you make in today's session. At the end of today's 
session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you remain 
silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need 
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
you.
Before the first decision round begins, half of the participants will be 
assigned to be a Player One and half will be assigned to be a Player Two. You 
will then remain in that same role for all decision rounds. Each of you has an 
assigned subject number. At the beginning of each decision round, subjects are 
randomly paired by subject numbers. There will be X decision rounds. Both 
players will receive $10 for participating in the experiment.
Overview
Each period, the cost of implementing a project is randomly determined 
and revealed only to Player Two. The cost is randomly drawn each period from 
the set of possible costs (0,1,2,3,...,199,200). These numbers represent pennies 
(i.e., 200=$2.00). Each number is equally likely to be drawn each period. Player 
Two then learns the cost. Player One NEVER LEARNS THE ACTUAL COST. If 
approved, the project yields revenue of 200 ($2) to Player One. If the project is 
rejected, both players receive nothing from the investment.
Always Signal Setting
Player Two's Task
At the beginning of each decision round, Player Two privately observes 
the actual cost. After observing the actual cost, Player Two submits a budget 
request to Player One. The budget request must be equal to or greater than the 
actual cost.  In addition to submitting the budget request, Player Two also 
submits a signal that indicates in which 1/4th of the cost distribution the actual 
cost lays. The signal can be 0-50, 51-100, 101-150, 151-200 and will always be 
consistent with the actual cost.
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Player One's Task
Each decision round Player One receives a budget request and cost 
signal from Player Two. Based on the request and signal, Player One chooses to 
either accept or reject the budget request made by the Player Two with whom 
they were matched in the round. If accepted, Player One pays the budget 
request to Player Two and receives the project revenue of 200 ($2). The payoff 
for Player One is the 200 minus Player Two's budget request. The payoff for 
Player Two is the budget request minus the actual cost of the project. If rejected, 
both players receive nothing from the investment.
Example
If Player Two observes an actual cost of 136, Player Two can submit a 
request equal to any integer between 136 and 200. For example, assume that 
Player Two submits a request of 157. In addition to this budget request, Player 
Two sends a cost signal which will be 126-150. Player One will then observe both 
the request of 157 and the cost signal of 126-150. Using this information, Player 
One decides either to accept or reject the investment. If accepted, Player One 
receives 200 and pays 157 to Player Two (meaning that Player One's net 
earnings are 43). Player Two receives 157 – 136 = 21 (meaning that Player 




At the beginning of each decision round, Player Two privately observes 
the actual cost. After observing the actual cost, Player Two submits a budget 
request to the Player One. The budget request must be equal to or greater than 
the actual cost.  In addition to submitting the budget request, Player Two has the 
option of submitting a cost signal that indicates which 1/4th, or 1/8th of the cost 
distribution the actual cost lies in or Player Two can choose to send no cost 
signal whatsoever. The signal can either have 1/4th accuracy (which would 
indicate 0-50, 51-100, 101-150, or 151-200), or 1/8th accuracy (which would 
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indicate 0-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, 101-125, 126-150, 151-175, or 176-200) and 
will always be consistent with the actual cost. In other words, Player Two can 
choose to send a truthful signal with either 1/4th, or 1/8th accuracy or no signal at 
all. Remember that Player Two can choose to send no signal and Player One will 
observe just Player Two's budget request.
Player One's Task
Each decision round Player One receives a budget request and cost 
signal from Player Two, if Player Two chooses to send a cost signal. Based on 
the request and signal (if available), Player One chooses to either accept or 
reject Player Two's budget request. If accepted, Player One pays the full budget 
request amount to Player Two and receives the entire project revenue of 200 
($2). This makes the payoff for Player One is the 200 minus Player Two's budget 
request and the payoff for Player Two is the budget request minus the actual cost 
of the project. If rejected, both players receive nothing from the investment.
Example
If Player Two participant observes actual costs of 136, Player Two can 
submit a request equal to any integer between 136 and 200. For the purpose of 
this example, assume that Player Two submits a request of 157. In addition to 
this budget request, Player Two can choose to send a cost signal with 1/4th 
accuracy (101-150), 1/8th accuracy (126-150), or no cost signal at all. Player One 
will observe both the request of 157 and the cost signal, if Player Two chooses to 
send one. Using this information, Player One decides either to accept or reject 
the investment. If accepted, Player One receives 200 and pays 157 to Player 
Two (meaning that Player One's net earnings are 43). Player Two receives 157 – 
136 = 21 (meaning that Player Two's net earnings are 21). If rejected, neither 
player receives anything from the investment.
Bowen - 41
Appendix B: Post-Hoc Questionnaire
Participants were provided with the following statements and a seven point 
scale that asked them to rank how much they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement. 1 indicated that the participant completely disagreed with the 
statement, 4 was neutral, and 7 meant that they completely agreed.
Agent Questions
1) I wanted to leave the other player with a fair amount of profit.
2) I wanted to report honestly to the other player.
3) I used the cost signal as a means of indicating my honest reporting.
4) I cared about sending a budget report that was within the cost signal's 
range.
5) The possibility that the other player could reject a project kept my budget 
request conservative.
6) I did not consider the other player's profit when making my budget 
request.
Principal Questions
1) The other player's budget request had to provide a fair allocation of profit 
in order for me to approve the project.
2) If the other player did not include a cost signal, I was more likely to reject 
the project.
3) If a high budget request from the other player was coupled with a cost 
signal indicated a high actual cost, I was still willing to approve the project 
even though it offered me very little profit.
4) If the other player's budget request was outside of the cost signal, I was 
more likely to reject the project.
5) I used my power of rejection to punish the other player for unfair budget 
requests.
